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The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims 
JOLINE DOEDENS* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The enduring difficulty of practicing asylum law is its discretionary nature. 
It is not an inalienable right, guaranteed in the face of any infringement of state 
sovereignty. Rather, it is legally and practically an international right realized in 
a domestic space, under domestic law. International human rights law affirms an 
individual’s right to seek refuge and asylum in another country in order to 
escape persecution in his or her home country,1 and further ensures that a 
receiving country cannot send an individual back to the country of his or her 
persecution.2 The domestic legal systems of individual nations have the 
discretion to define the criteria for obtaining such protection from persecution, 
with the exception of general guidelines set out in the United Nations Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. As a result of this 
domestic application of international human rights standards, the United States 
is able to define the right, as it has with many international human rights 
standards, as narrowly as it sees fit. The narrowed definition is further limited by 
the discretion of the government officials charged with enforcing the human 
rights standards. This is particularly true in the case of domestic violence-based 
asylum claims. Not only do the he-said, she-said cases typical of domestic 
violence incidents dominate domestic-violence based asylum claims, but the 
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 1.  See generally, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution”); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
1951 U.S.T. 563 (specifying the rights of asylees and refugees in a unified international instrument, 
and defining a refugee as anyone who, as a result of persecution suffered before January 1, 1951, is 
outside his or her country of origin); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223 (expanding the definition of “refugee” by removing the temporal limitation); Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2312(XXII) (Dec. 14, 1967) 
(specifying that the receiving state has the authority to evaluate an individual applicant’s eligibility 
for asylum); and, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) (providing guidance to government officials 
charged with determining refugee and asylee status). 
 2.  See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, Apr. 22, 1954, 1951 U.S.T. 563 (“No 
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”); see also Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, (incorporating articles 2 through 34 of the 
1951 Convention, including the principle of non-refoulement in article 33 of the Convention). 
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aggressor, as with most asylum claims, is also necessarily absent from the 
proceedings. Instead, an Immigration Judge charged with enforcing the United 
States’ immigration law must determine whether an individual’s experience of 
domestic violence in an entirely separate country was neither too personal to the 
individual perpetrator and victim, nor too universal an expression of (primarily 
male) aggression. 
My aim in this article is to demonstrate that the individual’s fundamental 
right to be free from persecution is hardly fundamental at all in the case of 
asylum law because it is subject to both a discretionary legal standard intended 
to comply with international law standards and the discretionary application of 
that standard in an individual case. Domestic violence as a ground for asylum is 
particularly likely to fail under this dual discretionary framework because of 
where such a claim falls within the legal framework. Unlike claims for asylum 
based on race, religion, classic political opinion, or nationality, domestic 
violence-based asylum claims must demonstrate that the feared or experienced 
persecution occurred on account of either the individual applicant’s membership 
in a particular social group, or an imputed political opinion of opposition to 
female subjugation. Naturally, finding that such a particular social group exists, 
or finding that an individual possesses such a circumscribed political opinion is 
in itself subject to significant discretion, and can create a political conundrum. 
In order to demonstrate the nullification of the asylum right in the case of a 
victim of domestic violence, I will proceed first with a description of each of the 
levels of discretion: the general requirements for a claim of asylum in the United 
States, the discretionary application of such a standard in the various federal 
circuits (particularly the Ninth Circuit, whose rule is separate and distinct from 
its sister circuits), and the general requirements and application of those 
requirements for an asylum claim based on membership in a particular social 
group. I will then outline the development of domestic violence-based asylum 
claims, starting with the Ninth Circuit case of Lazo-Majano v. I.N.S. in 1987, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in In re R-A- in 2001, and the BIA’s 
recent decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- in August of 2014. Finally, I will compare 
domestic violence-based asylum claims with other gender- and sex-based asylum 
claims, such as those based on a fear of female genital mutilation and persecution 
based on sexual orientation or transgender identity. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
The foundational document defining refugees and outlining their basic 
rights under international human rights law is the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.3 Although the Convention was originally intended to deal 
only with the refugee crises caused by World War II, and was therefore limited 
to individuals who had become refugees because of events occurring before 
January 1, 1951, the drafters hoped the standards outlined in the Convention 
would endure beyond this deadline.4 This was accomplished with the 1967 
 
 3.  The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 4.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires 
Analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weiss 4 (1990), available at 
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Protocol to the Status of Refugees, which removed the Convention’s temporal 
and geographic restrictions.5 
Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol on November 1, 
1968, it was not until 1980 that Congress actually brought domestic law into 
conformity with the country’s international obligations through the passage of 
the Refugee Act of 1980.6 As a result, the 1951 Convention’s definition of a 
refugee was codified in U.S. law as any person who “is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her country of origin] because 
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”7 
Although one would expect the codification of an internationally recognized 
definition of a refugee to lead to uniform application of the law, in reality, the 
United States initially granted asylum claims primarily when such an action 
favored the country’s foreign policy interests.8 In the early 1990s, the 
Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) divorced the adjudication of 
affirmative asylum cases (i.e. those where applicants brought a claim of asylum 
without first being charged with deportability) from the regular Examinations 
Branch, creating a group of agents who specialized in asylum case review and 
thereby decreasing the influence of ideological and foreign policy concerns in 
asylum law.9 
Even with the increased “neutrality” applied to the evaluation of asylum 
applications, there is still plenty of opportunity for discretion, most notably 
through the interpretation of the codified definition of a refugee by Immigration 
Judges (IJs), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and federal appeals court 
judges. Under the statutory definition of a refugee, an applicant must show (1) a 
well-founded fear (2) of persecution (3) on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.10 Before proceeding 
with a discussion of what this definition of refugee means for victims of domestic 
violence who wish to apply for asylum, it is first necessary to examine how this 
definition has evolved through case law. 
 
A. How Afraid Are You? Establishing a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 
Under the statutory definition of a refugee, an asylum applicant must have 
a well-founded fear of persecution.11 However, what constitutes “persecution” is 
not statutorily defined, and has only been developed through the case law of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals. In the seminal case of Matter of Acosta, the BIA 
noted that “persecution” has generally been construed to mean “either a threat to 
 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.html (citing Recommendation E. of the Convention, in which the 
Conference “[e]xpressed the hope that the Convention would have value as an example exceeding its 
contractual scope . . . .”). 
 5.  Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, concluded Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223. 
 6.  Id.; Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
 7.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 8.  IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW 1-1 (2d ed. 2013). 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 11.  Id. 
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the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who 
differ in a way regarded as offensive.”12 Since the federal courts of appeals must 
generally apply Chevron deference to any agency interpretation of a governing 
statute that is reasonable, this understanding of what constitutes “persecution” 
also applies on appeal from the BIA.13 However, persecution may arise out of the 
cumulative effect of harm resulting from incidents that would not independently 
amount to persecution, such as discrimination under conditions of insecurity in 
the country of origin, according to the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugees Status, which is published by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees and considered a relevant source for interpreting 
U.S. asylum law.14 
A further complication in finding a well-founded fear of persecution is that 
such a fear is necessarily subjective and objective. That is, the applicant must 
both experience the persecution as such, and a reasonable individual under his 
or her circumstances must also experience the conduct at issue as persecution.15 
Interestingly, the BIA has held that the perpetrator of the allegedly persecutory 
conduct need not intend to harm or to persecute the applicant for his or her 
conduct to qualify as persecution.16 By broadening the definition of persecution 
in this way, the BIA has created room for asylum claims based on cultural 
practices, such as female genital mutilation. 
Further room for asylum claims based on “private,” superficially apolitical 
persecution is evident in the possibility of persecution by both state and non-
state actors. Where an applicant believes she has suffered persecution at the 
hands of a state actor (i.e. a member of the government or a government-
sponsored organization), she does not need to show that she attempted to report 
the suffered harm (or the fear of such harm) to the local police.17 However, when 
 
 12.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 13.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding 
that, on review of an agency’s construction of its governing statute, a court must first determine 
whether the agency has contradicted Congress’s clearly expressed intent; if Congress has not 
expressed any clear intent, then the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute”).  See Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(outlining the two-step analysis from Chevron in an immigration context); United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“The weight accorded to an administrative judgment will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 14.  Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status ¶ 53 (1992), available at 
http://www.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/hbpart1.htm#Handbook Chapter One 
[hereinafter U.N. Handbook]; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
438–39 (1987) (finding the Handbook an appropriate source for interpreting asylum law, given that 
the entire purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring U.S. domestic law into conformity with its 
international obligations). 
 15.  U.N. Handbook, supra note 14, ¶ 52. 
 16.  Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that a subjective “punitive” 
or “malignant” intent is not required for the harm to constitute persecution in the context of the 
common cultural practice of female genital cutting). 
 17.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2013) (“In cases in which the persecutor is a government or is 
government sponsored . . . it shall be presumed that internal relocation would not be reasonable . . . 
.”); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “when the government is 
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the applicant has suffered harm that she believes amounts to persecution from a 
non-state actor, she must show that the government is unwilling or unable to 
control the violence, either by showing that the government tried and failed to 
protect her, or by showing the government refused to take action to protect her.18 
Although the easiest way for an applicant to show that her government is 
unwilling or unable to protect her is by showing a record (or lack thereof) of 
police action taken after she filed a report, she can also demonstrate the futility of 
making a police report by providing evidence that others have “made reports of 
similar incidents to no avail,” or by showing that “private persecution of a 
particular sort is widespread and well-known but not controlled by the 
government.”19 
Case law and relevant regulations have also limited the types of harm that 
amount to persecution. For example, while multiple beatings and non-life 
threatening violence can be sufficient in some cases, in other cases, courts have 
refused to recognize even multiple beatings as persecution.20 However, there are 
certain gender-based inflictions of violence that usually qualify as persecution. 
For example, in Ochave v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit 
held that “[r]ape is the kind of infliction of suffering or harm that may support a 
finding of past persecution, provided that the applicant demonstrates that the 
rape was on account of a statutorily protected ground, such as an imputed 
political opinion.”21 Similarly, the BIA has held that female genital mutilation can 
constitute persecution.22 The Department of Justice emphasizes, however, that a 
victim must experience the treatment as harm in order to have suffered 
persecution.23 
An applicant may also, in some cases, establish persecution based on 
mental, emotional, and psychological harm. For example, in Kovac v. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit held that persecution could result 
from both physical and mental harm.24 Similarly, in Abay v. Ashcroft, the Sixth 
Circuit held that a mother could establish persecution based on her “fear that her 
daughter [would] be subjected to the torture of female genital mutilation.”25 In 
the domestic violence context, these precedents, despite coming from the federal 
courts instead of the BIA, are useful for the proposition that persecution is not 
necessarily limited to physical harm, but could be supplemented by 
psychological harm, which in fact often increases the total trauma experienced by 
the victim.26 
 
responsible for persecution . . . no inquiry into whether a petitioner reported the persecution to police 
is necessary”). 
 18.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 2-4 to 2-5. 
 19.  Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Afriye v. Holder, 613 F.3d, 
924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2010) and Avetova-Elisseva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 
1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
 20.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 2-8. 
 21.  Ochave v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 254 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 22.  Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).  
 23.  Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76590 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000). 
 24.  Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102, 106–07 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 25.  Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 26.  NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE 1–2, available at 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/PsychologicalAbuse.pdf. 
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It is also important to note the difference between having a well-founded 
fear based on past persecution, and a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
Under the regulations governing asylum applications, if an applicant can 
demonstrate past persecution, she is entitled to the presumption that she will 
have a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.27 With this presumption, 
the burden shifts to the government to show either that there has been a 
“fundamental change in circumstance such that the applicant no longer has a 
well-founded fear of persecution,” or that the applicant could reasonably relocate 
within her country of origin in order to avoid persecution.28 In the case of 
domestic and other family violence, it may often be possible for the government 
to argue that it would be reasonable for an asylum applicant to relocate within 
her home country and thereby escape the violence. 
Finally, the refugee definition also requires that an applicant’s fear of 
persecution be well founded. This does not mean that the applicant has a greater 
than 50% chance of suffering persecution upon return to her country of origin. 
Rather, the applicant must demonstrate a subjectively genuine and objectively 
reasonable fear of returning to her country of origin.29 In determining whether 
the applicant’s fear of persecution is objectively reasonable, courts consider 
various factors, including: (1) whether the applicant was individually targeted;30 
(2) whether any of the applicant’s family members have suffered violence at the 
hands of alleged persecutors;31 (3) whether there is a pattern or practice of 
persecution of similarly situated individuals in the applicant’s country of 
origin;32 and (4) whether the threat of persecution for the applicant is country-
wide.33 
B. Does Your Fear Qualify You as a Refugee?: Establishing the Nexus Between a 
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and the Protected Ground 
An applicant does not qualify for asylum merely by showing that he or she 
has a well-founded fear of persecution. No matter how terrible the harm 
suffered, an applicant cannot qualify for asylum unless she can also show that 
the persecution occurred on account of one of the five enumerated grounds – (1) 
race, (2) religion, (3) national original, (4) membership in a particular social 
group, or (5) political opinion – by showing some evidence of the persecutor’s 
motives.34 The problem in practice, of course, is that persecutors are not purists. 
 
 27.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013). 
 28.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B) (2013). 
 29.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431, 440 (1987).  
 30.  Salari v. Ashcroft, 114 F. App’x 815, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Even if this past harm were not 
sufficient to demonstrate past persecution, it does demonstrate the reasonableness of [the applicant’s] 
fear of future persecution.”) 
 31.  Korablina v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Persecution may be found by cumulative, specific instances of violence and harassment toward an 
individual or her family members . . . .”) 
 32.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2013). 
 33.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (2013). 
 34.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992) (holding 
that an asylum applicant must show at least some proof the alleged persecutor’s motivation in order 
to fulfill the “on the account of” requirement). 
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In many cases, an alleged persecutor harms an asylum applicant for several 
reasons, only one of which may constitute an enumerated grounds.35 Under the 
REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress dictated that race, religion, national origin, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion “was or will be at 
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”36 
Race, religion, and national origin are not used as enumerated grounds in 
domestic violence-based asylum claims, and are therefore outside the scope of 
this paper, but membership in a particular social group and political opinion are 
applicable in the case of domestic violence. 
 
1. Take a Stand. . . or Don’t: How Political Do You Need to Be? 
A political opinion, for the purposes of the refugee definition, need not be 
expressed through participation in organized political activities.37 Further, a 
qualifying political opinion may be expressed non-verbally or only in private.38 
There is no requirement that an asylum applicant act on her political opinion in 
order to be subject to persecution on account of that political opinion.39 A 
political opinion can actually include the view that certain rights, such as the 
right to privacy, the right to bodily integrity, the right to have a family, and the 
right to have unfettered reproductive choice, are fundamental and that “the 
election to exercise them should be respected and not trampled.”40 
Furthermore, a political opinion may be imputed when through legally 
cognizable inferences or otherwise, “an alien establishes a prima facie case that he 
is likely to be persecuted because of the government’s belief about his views or 
loyalties, his actual political conduct, be it silence or affirmative advocacy, and 
his actual political views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are irrelevant; 
False”41 As such, even if an individual does not himself or herself hold a 
particular political opinion that a persecutor opposes, that political opinion may 
be imputed to the asylum applicant if the persecutor was motivated by that 
political opinion to persecute the applicant. For example, in Hernandez-Ortiz v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
 35.  See Gafoor v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 231 F.3d 645, 650 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[M]otives can be difficult to pin down . . . Persecutors do not always take the time to tell their 
victims all the reasons they are being beaten or kidnaped or killed.”)  
 36.  REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 37.  Meza-Menay v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 139 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 38.  Rivas-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting the BIA’s reasoning that, since the applicant gave a non-political excuse for not assisting her 
alleged persecutors, she necessarily was not persecuted on account of her political opinion because 
(1) it would be absurd to require asylum applicants to “foolhardily court death by informed armed 
guerrillas to their faces that she detests them or their actions or their ideologies,” and (2) it is wrong 
to assume that the persecutors believed the applicant’s proffered non-political reason for her refusal 
to comply with their demands). 
 39.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-8 (citing DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 297 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999)). 
 40.  In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 921−22 (B.I.A. 1997) (concurring opinion) overruled on other 
grounds by Att’y Gen. Order No. 2964-2008 (May 15, 2008). 
 41.  Hernandez-Ortiz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
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considered evidence of the government of El Salvador killing, kidnapping, 
beating, threatening, robbing, and harassing the applicant’s family members to 
find that she had established a prima facie case of persecution on account of her 
imputed political opinion, even though the applicant herself had not suffered 
such violence.42 
 
2. To Which Clique Do You Belong?: Define Your Particular Social Group 
In order to establish membership in a particular social group as a ground 
for persecution, an asylum applicant must meet a high standard subject to the 
discretion of the IJ. First, the applicant must demonstrate that membership in his 
or her particular social group is based on an immutable characteristic, judicially 
defined as “a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to 
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not 
be required to be changed.”43 Such a characteristic could be innate, such as sex, 
color, or kinship ties, or a shared experience, such as former military leadership 
or land ownership.44 
Second, an applicant must show that his or her proposed particular social 
group has sufficient “particularity”—that the group is “sufficiently distinct that it 
would constitute a discrete class of persons.”45 In other words, the applicant 
must be able to show that the immutable characteristics “provide a clear 
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”46 
Last, the applicant must supply a particular social group that has sufficient 
“social distinction” or “social visibility.” In essence, the proposed group must be 
perceived as a group by the society in which it is situated; members of the 
relevant society need not be able to identify the group’s members on sight.47 
Examples of groups that satisfy these three requirements include family ties, clan 
membership, sexual orientation, and former gang membership.48 Gender, as a 
relevant immutable characteristic that applicants either cannot change or should 
not be required to change, qualifies as a defining characteristic of a social group, 
along with other “immutable/fundamental characteristics”, including bodily 
integrity and refusal to conform or submit.49 
II. WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK?: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM 
When the refugee definition was first codified in 1951, domestic violence 
was not understood as a punishable offense in many countries, let alone as 
grounds for claiming asylum. In the United States, from the 1920s through the 
1970s, victims of domestic abuse (i.e. wife beating and child abuse) were seen as 
part of the problem, and “domestic trouble cases” were seen as an opportunity to 
 
 42.  Id. at 516–17. 
 43.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210 (B.I.A. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
 46.  Id. at 214. 
 47.  Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 48.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-25 to 3-29. 
 49.  Id. at 3-32. 
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help women “master the habits of cleanliness, nutrition, and childcare.”50 Thus, 
the concept of domestic violence was considered a private issue, to be solved 
only by ensuring that the victims of violence stopped causing their batterers to 
get angry and attack. If an applicant had proposed, even after the signing of the 
1967 Protocol, that domestic violence could be a basis for asylum, adjudicators 
likely would have ridiculed those lawyers radical enough to bring such a claim. 
Nevertheless, ever since the Board of Immigration Appeals first held in 
Matter of Acosta that sex was among the immutable characteristics that could 
define a particular social group, two legal theories have evolved for treating 
domestic violence as a qualifying form of persecution.51 
 
A. Are You Feminist Enough?: Political Opinion as a Basis For Gender-Based 
Asylum 
First, the doctrine of imputed political opinion can be used where the victim 
opposed laws that discriminate against her on the basis of gender, or where she 
fears persecution on the basis of her feminist beliefs. Iranian women seem to be 
the most compelling case for an imputed political opinion, although the courts 
are reluctant to actually grant these women’s asylum applications. For example, 
in Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Third Circuit held that an 
Iranian woman who opposed Iran’s gender-specific laws was not entitled to 
asylum because she did not show that she was a member of her proposed 
particular social group (women who would prefer to suffer the consequences of 
noncompliance with the discriminatory laws).52 In addition, the applicant never 
showed that she would refuse to comply with the gender-specific laws.53 
Similarly, in Sharif v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Seventh 
Circuit found that even if “Westernized women” in Iran constituted a particular 
social group, the applicant failed to show that she would be “either unable or 
unwilling to comply with Iranian law when she return[ed] to Iran.”54 The 
applicant further failed to prove that she would voice her Western notions when 
she returned to Iran, since she had no history of objecting to Iran’s discriminatory 
laws.55 The Court sympathized with the applicant because it understood that a 
woman who did not agree with the prevailing gender hierarchy in Iran would 
not enjoy living there, but it found that a preference for an American lifestyle 
was not sufficient for a successful asylum claim.56 
Finally, in Safaie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Eighth Circuit 
held that an Iranian woman who advocated women’s rights and opposed Iranian 
dress and behavior codes for women was not entitled to asylum because the 
applicant wore the required dress and was not actually harmed or mistreated for 
 
 50.  KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
386 (6th ed. 2013) (citing Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 992–93 (1995)). 
 51.  Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 52.  Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Sharif v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 87 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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participating in the taboo activities of smoking and wearing makeup.57 Further, 
the Court found that the applicant did not have some “missionary fever to defy 
the law,” and could in fact avoid any danger of persecution by refraining from 
expressing her opposition to the restrictions on women’s activities in Iranian 
law.58 
The question of whether an Iranian woman should be required to risk 
subjecting herself to corporal punishment in Iran in order to establish her 
membership in a women’s rights-minded, particular social group is a matter 
outside the scope of this paper, but demonstrates another instance in which the 
requirements for a successful asylum claim can seem unreasonable. These 
gender-based political opinion cases are themselves highly political. In all three 
cases, the federal court is reluctant to condone the discriminatory laws in force in 
Iran, but the judges are also hesitant to find that opposition to those laws 
qualifies an individual woman for asylum. In Fatin, the Third Circuit held that 
the applicant did not qualify for asylum because she did not actually express her 
opposition to the discriminatory laws.59 This seems to contradict the standard 
enumerated in Rivas-Martinez, where the Fifth Circuit pointed out that it would 
be ridiculous to require political opponents to express their disfavored opinions 
to their possible persecutors;60 the essential requirement is that the persecutor 
must have persecuted the applicant, or will likely persecute the applicant in the 
future on his or her return to his or her country of origin on account of that 
political opinion. 
The Seventh Circuit made a similar erroneous distinction in Sharif, when it 
found that the applicant did not qualify for asylum in part because she was not 
likely to express her western point of view about a woman’s role in society upon 
her return to Iran.61 The Eighth Circuit departed even further from the Rivas-
Martinez standard in Safaie when it acknowledged that the applicant would 
continue to engage in taboo activities upon her return to Iran, and thereby would 
express her political opposition, but that the applicant did not qualify for asylum 
because she did not possess the requisite missionary zeal to fight the 
discriminatory laws, and would be willing to refrain from expressing her 
opinions in order to avoid persecution.62 
 
B. Are You Unique Enough?: Membership in a Particular Social Group as a Basis 
for Gender-Based Asylum Claims 
As is apparent from the discussion of the Iranian cases in the previous 
subsection, the federal courts and the BIA have a tendency to mingle the 
standards for membership in a particular social group and political opinion, 
finding that an individual who held feminist beliefs did not express them clearly, 
loudly, and consistently enough to qualify for membership in the relevant 
 
 57.  Safaie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 60.  Rivas-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 61.  Sharif, 87 F.3d at 936. 
 62.  Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640. 
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particular social group. As a result, it is important not only to ensure that the 
applicant actually fits into the proposed particular social group, but also that the 
proposed group is defined by immutable characteristics that make the group 
sufficiently particular and socially distinct. 
For example, in Kante v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit found that the particular 
social group of “women subjected to rape as a method of government control” 
did not qualify as a group for the purposes of an asylum claim because they were 
circularly defined by the persecution suffered—the members (women subjected 
to rape as a method of government control) suffered persecution on account of 
such membership because they were raped as a method of government control, 
or were at risk of such treatment (i.e. the persecution).63 In addition, the Court 
found that the broader social group of just women (defined by the immutable 
characteristic of sex) did not qualify because the applicant did not show that the 
Guinean government or society “viewed females as a group specifically targeted 
for mistreatment.”64 
An example of a successful asylum claim based on membership in a 
particular social group is in the Third Circuit case of Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney 
General of the United States. In that case, the Court denied the applicant’s claims 
that her abduction and involuntary confinement by a guerilla group, and her 
subsequent surveillance by the group to determine whether she was dating any 
government officers, qualified her for asylum because the applicant’s political 
opinion was not “one central reason” for her persecution.65 Thus, she was not 
entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution based on 
her past persecution. However, the Court did find that the applicant had a well-
founded fear of persecution based on her membership in the particular social 
group of Colombian women who escaped involuntary servitude after being 
abducted and confined by a guerrilla group.66 The defined social group was not 
circular because the feared persecution was death, not abduction or confinement. 
Further, the Court found that this fear was subjectively genuine—the applicant 
feared she would be killed if she did not go back to work for the guerrilla 
group.67 In addition, the applicant’s fear was objectively reasonable because 
several of her family members had been harmed or threatened by the guerrilla 
group, the applicant herself had been receiving threatening phone calls and 
messages since her abduction, and state department reports supported her 
argument that the guerrilla group practiced “systemic and pervasive” forced 
conscription and violence.68 
The principal difference between Kante and Gomez-Zuluaga is one of degree 
as well as credibility of the witness. The applicant in Kante had been attacked in 
the past, but the Court found that she failed to establish that the attack was 
caused by Guinean government forces motivated by retribution for her father’s 
political activity, and was hesitant to trust her description of the past attack 
 
 63.  Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 64.  Id. at 327. 
 65.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 66.  Id. at 346–48. 
 67.  Id. at 347. 
 68.  Id. at 347–48.  
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because she changed the description of her attackers between her first and 
second asylum applications.69 Of course, it is well established that one symptom 
of rape trauma syndrome is an inability to recall the specific events of the 
trauma, so it is not at all surprising that an asylum applicant, faced with the 
ominous task of describing her attackers for the purposes of avoiding 
deportation to the country where she was attacked, would have confused 
memories of what her attackers looked like.70 This is not to say that all asylum 
applicants who claim memory loss on account of rape trauma syndrome are 
necessarily credible and should automatically be granted asylum on account of 
an appropriately defined particular social group. Rather, asylum law and 
immigration law in general should at least place the memory loss in the context 
of the trauma suffered, as is done in domestic U.S. criminal law.71 
By contrast, in Gomez-Zuluaga, the applicant suffered a considerably less 
gendered form of past persecution (abduction and confinement), even though 
this past persecution did not qualify her for asylum because it was not on 
account of an enumerated ground. Further, she was able to identify a particular 
social group that was not defined by a gendered harm (such as rape), and did not 
suffer from the problem of circularity. In Gomez-Zuluaga, the inclusion of 
“women” in the definition of the proposed particular social group was nothing 
more than a limiting characteristic. It had very little bearing on the type of 
persecution that would be suffered. Sex in this case was nothing more than a 
benchmark that helped to define who was in the group and who was not. 
Further, the applicant did not suffer from the unfortunate possible memory loss 
that the applicant in Kante could have experienced as a result of her past attack. 
 
C. The Legal Basis for Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum 
The first successful domestic violence-based asylum case was the Ninth 
Circuit decision in Lazo-Majano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. There, an 
army sergeant physically and sexually abused a female applicant, compelling her 
to leave the country.72 The Court found that persecution was “stamped on every 
page” of the record, and that the applicant had been “singled out to be bullied, 
beaten, injured, raped, and enslaved.”73 The Court determined that the sergeant 
had “assert[ed] the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate,” and 
 
 69.  Kante, 634 F.3d at 325. 
 70.  Rape Trauma Syndrome, CMTY. CRISIS CTR., INC., 
http://www.crisiscenter.org/images/SAINDoc7.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  See also Holly 
Hogan, The False Dichotomy of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GEND. 529, 533 (2005-2006) 
(citing several studies supporting the proposition that “rape victims may have trouble remembering 
and may even give inconsistent statements about the rape, which may be counterintuitive behavior 
responses to some who believe that one would never forget such a traumatic experience”). 
 71.  BARTLETT, ET AL., supra note 50, at 631–32 (noting that “[s]ome courts have approved use of 
expert testimony about rape trauma syndrome to help prove that a forcible assault, rather than 
consensual sex, occurred . . . .”) 
 72.  Lazo-Majano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 813 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1987) 
overruled on other grounds by Fisher v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the Court of Appeals’ review is limited to the administrative record on which the 
deportation order is based and the Attorney General’s findings of fact). 
 73.  Id. at 1434. 
Doedens_JCI (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2015 3:08 PM 
 The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims 123 
that the applicant showed her opposition to that political opinion by fleeing the 
country.74 The applicant was not allowed to hold an opinion contrary to that of 
the sergeant—“[w]hen by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to 
persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of her political 
opinion.”75 Once again, the Court had trouble basing its decision on the gendered 
violence that the applicant suffered at the hands of her persecutor. Instead, the 
Court imagined both the persecutor and the victim to have a political opinion 
about the appropriate power relation between the sexes. Further, given the 
persecutor’s position in the Armed Forces, “a military power that exercises 
domination over much of El Salvador despite the staunchest efforts of the Duarte 
government to restrain it,” the Court easily got around the issue of whether the 
applicant’s fear of persecution would be country-wide—she reasonably believed 
that the sergeant would be able to use his connections to find her if she escaped 
within El Salvador.76 
The Lazo-Majano approach of using a domestic violence victim’s political 
beliefs for a claim of asylum stood alone in immigration case law until 1999, 
when the Board of Immigration Appeals tackled the case of Rody Alvarado. 
Rody’s husband spent the entirety of their marriage mistreating her.77 He had to 
know what she was doing at every moment of every day and accompanied her 
everywhere except for her workplace.78 He threatened her with stories of killing 
babies and the elderly while he was in the army, and often got drunk.79 When 
Rody complained about her husband’s drinking he would yell at her, and once 
clenched her hand and continued drinking until he passed out.80 Over the course 
of the marriage, the violence increased, as Rody’s husband dislocated her jaw 
when her period was 15 days late, and beat her before and after he raped her.81 If 
she resisted, her husband would accuse her of cheating and threaten to kill her.82 
Rody tried to escape her husband’s wrath by running away to the homes of 
family members, but he always found her.83 When she tried to flee the city with 
her children, her husband found them again, and beat her unconscious.84 During 
the trial, Rody at first maintained that she did not know why her husband 
treated her so badly, but she guessed it had something to do with his own 
mistreatment during his time in the army.85 Rody also tried to report her 
husband’s abusive behavior to the police and to the courts. Her husband ignored 
the police’s summons to appear and the police failed to take further action. A 
judge told Rody that he “would not interfere in domestic disputes.”86 The BIA, 
 
 74.  Id. at 1435. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 1434. 
 77.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
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upon hearing the horrific tales of Rody’s abuse, “struggle[d] to describe how 
deplorable [the court] find[s] the husband’s conduct to have been.”87 Neither the 
Immigration Judge nor the BIA had much trouble finding that the beatings and 
rapes Rody suffered constituted past persecution, and that the Guatemalan 
government was unwilling or unable to control Rody’s husband.88 The IJ found 
that Rody was persecuted both on account of her imputed political opinion “that 
women should not be dominated by men,” and on account of her membership in 
the particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe that women are to 
live under male domination.”89 
On the first hearing of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
struggled to find a ground for a domestic violence-based asylum claim. 
Reviewing the record, the BIA found no indication of any political opinion of the 
applicant, and inferred from the duration and the persistence of the abuse, 
despite Rody’s many attempts to appease her husband, that the abuse was 
completely unrelated to any political opinion, imputed or actual.90 Further, the 
BIA found that Rody’s proposed particular social group (“Guatemalan women 
who have been intimately involved with Guatemalan male companions who 
believe that women are to live under male domination”) did not qualify because 
it was defined for the purposes of the asylum case, and it seemed unlikely that 
any Guatemalan might recognize such a social group within their own society.91 
Moreover, the BIA failed to see how Rody’s husband’s behavior occurred on 
account of her membership in such a social group, since he did not “show[] an 
interest in any member of the group other than [Rody] herself.”92 Finding that 
Congress did not intend “social group” to provide a legal basis for domestic 
violence-based asylum claims, the Court punted the case back to the parties and 
to Congress, noting that the district director could grant Rody relief on 
humanitarian grounds, and that Congress could amend the asylum law to 
include an asylum claim for abused women.93 
In the nine years after the initial BIA decision, Attorney General Reno 
vacated the decision, the Department of Homeland Security issued a brief that 
conceded Rody’s eligibility for asylum based on her membership in the 
particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to 
leave their relationship,” and the DHS issued proposed regulations that have 
never been finalized. Finally, in 2008, Attorney General Mukasey directed the 
BIA to revisit the case in light of the new criteria of social visibility and 
 
 87.  Id. at 910. 
 88.  Id. at 911. 
 89.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 90.  Id. at 916 (“The respondent’s husband, it seems, must have had some reason or reasons for 
treating the respondent as he did. And it is possible that his own view of men and women played a 
role in his brutality, as may have been the case with the brutality that he himself experienced and 
witnessed. What we find lacking in the respondent’s showing, however, is any meaningful evidence 
that her husband’s behavior was influenced at all by his perception of the respondent’s opinion.”). 
 91.  Id. at 918 
 92.  Id. at 920. 
 93.  Id. at 928. 
Doedens_JCI (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2015 3:08 PM 
 The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims 125 
particularity of particular social groups.94 However, the original reasoning of the 
first BIA decision still applied, since Rody was granted asylum by the IJ in a one-
sentence unpublished opinion.95 As such, the heightened (and confusing) 
standards for what constitutes membership in a particular social group 
continued to apply: a victim of spousal abuse had to see herself (or himself) as a 
member of the defined social group, the abusers themselves also had to see their 
victims as a member of this group, and society itself had to consider the 
characteristic of being abused important.96 The stringency of these factors had the 
effect of making domestic violence-based asylum claims a very fact-intensive 
process that involved the recruitment of experts to testify on the perception of 
domestic violence in the applicant’s country of origin, and extensive preparation 
of the applicant herself (or himself), to ensure that she effectively portrayed her 
perception of herself as a member of the relevant social group, and that her 
abuser identified her as a group member as well. 
Running almost parallel with Rody Alvarado’s case was the case of Ms. L-R-
,97 who was raped at gunpoint by her 33-year-old sports coach when she was just 
nineteen years old, and subsequently suffered almost two decades of 
“unrelenting physical, sexual and emotional torment” from her attacker, who 
became her common-law husband.98 When L-R- became pregnant, she attempted 
to escape her abuser’s wrath and fled through a window, but her abuser found 
her at the bus stop, brought her home, locked her in their bedroom, and tried to 
kill her by burning her alive when she fell asleep that night.99 Luckily, she 
managed to put out the fire with wet towels.100 Although it was very difficult for 
L-R- to report her abuser’s behavior to the police due to his constant supervision, 
she managed to sneak out and file police reports on about eight occasions. 
However, every time she made a report, “the officer in charge made her show 
him her bruises, and touched her, before telling [her] that there was nothing the 
police could do because [her husband’s] abuse was a private matter and her life 
was not in danger.”101 Moreover, whenever L-R- went to the police, her abuser 
immediately found out about it because he was friendly with several police 
officers, and he would beat her even more as punishment.102 
In April 1995, L-R- returned home from work to find an empty house—all of 
her belongings and her children were gone, taken by her husband.103 She tried to 
 
 94.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-36. 
 95.  Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and 
Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURVEY 
QUARTERLY 46, 47 (2010). 
 96.  ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM LAW, supra note 8, at 3-37. 
 97.  Unlike Rody Alvarado, Ms. L-R-’s name has not been made public, as all asylum cases are 
confidential. 
 98.  Brief for Respondents in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withholding of Removal and 
CAT Relief at 10, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/L-R-_brief_immigration_court_03_10_2010.pdf 
[hereinafter CGRS Brief]. 
 99.  Id. at 19. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 20–21. 
 102.  Id. at 21. 
 103.  Id. at 23. 
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get help from the Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), an organization in the 
Mexican government that assists individuals with domestic violence problems, 
but the DIF attorney refused to help L-R- because her sister was president of DIF 
in a different town.104 L-R- also tried to go to court to get custody of her children, 
but the first judge awarded custody to her abuser, despite his knowledge of the 
abuse.105 The second judge informed L-R- that he would award her custody of 
her kids if she had sex with him.106 L-R- refused, and the judge accused her of 
being a bad mother, because “a good mother would do anything to get back her 
children.”107 
As a result of the extensive trauma she suffered, L-R- developed debilitating 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which prevented her from applying for 
asylum within the one-year deadline upon her arrival in the United States.108 The 
Immigration Judge consequently denied her claim, noting that she was perfectly 
capable of caring for her children, and further held that her abuser did not abuse 
her on account of any political opinion or membership in a particular social 
group, but merely because he was a violent man.109 Although the Department of 
Homeland Security initially defended the IJ’s ruling, the Department changed its 
position once President Obama took office, recommending that L-R- and her 
children redefine their proposed social group in order to avoid circularity 
problems and comply with the particularity and social visibility requirements 
that emerged in the case law during the pendency of the case.110 Originally, L-R- 
argued that she suffered persecution on account of her membership in the 
particular social group of “Mexican women in an abusive domestic relationship 
who are unable to leave.”111 The inclusion of “abusive” in the definition of the 
group rendered the definition impermissibly circular, as the persecution suffered 
was a condition of group membership. The Department of Homeland Security 
proposed two alternative groups that would meet the legal requirements—
”Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” or 
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within 
a domestic relationship”—and proposed that the case be remanded for 
additional fact-finding.112 On remand, the Center for Gender and Refugee 
Studies, who represented Ms. L-R-, submitted country condition reports 
demonstrating the atmosphere of indifference toward gender-based violence in 
Mexico, the machismo culture, and the widespread tolerance for domestic 
violence, as well as two affidavits from experts evidencing these same 
 
 104.  Id. at 24–25. 
 105.  Id. at 25. 
 106.  Id. at 26. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GEND. & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-l-r (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- at 6 (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009),  
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf  
[hereinafter DHS Brief in L-R-].  
 111.  Id. at 10 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 112.  Id. at 14, 29. 
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findings.113 In light of the additional evidence, the Department of Homeland 
Security stipulated that L-R- should be granted asylum, and an IJ granted the 
asylum in a summary order in August of 2010.114 
Against the backdrop of Matter of L-R- and Matter of R-A-, the recent 
decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- represents a groundbreaking achievement after 
nearly fifteen years of advocacy, as the Board of Immigration Appeals finally 
rendered a binding decision in which domestic violence served as the basis for 
an asylum claim.115 The respondents in the case, the lead respondent (“A-R-C-
G”) and her three minor children, were all natives of Guatemala who entered the 
United States without inspection.116 The lead respondent, as a credible witness, 
told the Immigration Judge of how she suffered weekly beatings at the hands of 
her husband after her first child was born, and of how one of those beatings 
resulted in a broken nose and another resulted in chemical burns when her 
husband threw paint thinner on her.117 The respondent testified that she 
contacted the local police several times in an effort to stop the violence, which 
included rape, but the police maintained that they would not interfere in marital 
conflicts.118 When the police came to the family home after the respondent’s 
husband hit her on the head, the husband threatened to kill the respondent if she 
tried to get the police involved again.119 Furthermore, the respondent attempted 
to escape her abusive relationship by moving within Guatemala’s borders to stay 
with her father and by moving to Guatemala City, but her husband always 
found her and the abuse always continued when she returned.120 The respondent 
believed that this pattern will repeat or worsen if she returned to Guatemala.121 
A-R-C-G-’s asylum claim was initially unsuccessful because of the 
requirement that her persecution be suffered on account of her membership in the 
particular social group of “married wom[e]n in Guatemala who [were] unable to 
leave the relationship.”122 The Immigration Judge found that the husband’s 
actions were merely the arbitrary criminal acts of a husband against his wife, 
rather than a rational pattern of persecutory conduct.123 Naturally, the 
respondent appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the BIA requested 
supplemental briefing on the issue of whether “domestic violence can, in some 
instances, form the basis for a claim of asylum or withholding of removal under 
sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the [Immigration Nationality] Act.”124 Thus 
pressured, the Department of Homeland Security was forced to concede that (1) 
 
 113.  Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GEND. & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-l-r (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 116.  Id. at 389. The minor respondents were derivatives of their mother’s asylum application, so 
the BIA did not address their individual claims for asylum.  
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 389–90. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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the harm the respondent suffered rose to the level of past persecution, and (2) 
that this persecution occurred on account of her membership in the particular 
social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship.”125 The only issue on which the DHS was unwilling to concede 
defeat was whether the “Guatemalan Government was unwilling or unable to 
control the “private” actor” (i.e. the respondent’s husband).126 
The Board of Immigration Appeals easily agreed with both parties that the 
lead respondent had shown that she was a member of a particular social group 
and suffered persecution on account of that status. The BIA pointed to the recent 
precedents of Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G- for the three requirements 
for any asylum claim based on membership in a particular social group—the 
asylum applicant “must establish that the group is (1) composed of members 
who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, 
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”127 According to the BIA, 
the lead respondent’s particular social group was defined by two common 
immutable characteristics: gender and marital status.128 While gender has been 
established as an immutable characteristic since Matter of Acosta,129 the 
qualification of marital status as an immutable characteristic “where the 
individual is unable to leave the relationship”130 is an important concession for 
domestic violence-based asylum claims. The BIA qualified this development on 
the consideration of a “range of factors,” many of which are dependent on local 
religious, cultural, and legal customs.131 
With the immutable characteristics thus established, the BIA found that the 
lead respondent’s proffered particular social group had sufficient particularity 
because “married,” “women,” and “unable to leave the relationship” are easily 
and commonly defined in Guatemalan society, and that the combination of the 
terms to define a single particular social group in this case “create[s] a group 
with discrete and definable boundaries.”132 Furthermore, in order to find that the 
lead respondent’s particular social group has sufficient social distinction, the BIA 
cites both the DHS’s agreement that the group exists,133 as well as the evidence in 
the record of Guatemala’s culture of “machismo and family violence” 134 and 
Guatemala’s documented difficulty dealing with sexual offenses, including 
spousal rape and domestic violence crimes.135 
 
 125.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 126.  Id. at 395. 
 127.  Id. at 392. 
 128.  Id. at 392–93. 
 129.  See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding that sex is an immutable 
characteristic). 
 130.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. at 392–93.  
 131.  Id. at 393. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 394. 
 134.  Id. at 388 (citing Guatemala Failing Its Murdered Women: Report, CANADA BROAD. CORP. NEWS 
(July 18, 2006, 11:06 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/guatemala-failing-its-murdered-women-
report-1.627240).   
 135.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DEMOCRACY, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: GUATEMALA 
(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119161.htm). 
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Even though the lead respondent successfully showed that she was a 
member of a particular social group, and that she suffered persecution on 
account of her membership in that particular social group, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals was not able to grant her asylum on these grounds.136 
Rather, she was still required to submit additional evidence to demonstrate that 
the Guatemalan police’s failure to take any sort of action in response to her 
complaints meant that the “government was unwilling or unable to control her 
husband.”137 Upon such a showing, the burden of proof would shift to the 
Department of State, who would then be required to show either that there had 
been a “fundamental change in circumstances such that the respondent no longer 
has a well-founded fear of persecution”138 or that “internal relocation is possible 
and is not unreasonable.”139 Missing from the BIA’s opinion was an admission 
that the respondent’s multiple unsuccessful attempts to leave her husband by 
staying with her father and moving to Guatemala City probably demonstrated 
that internal relocation would not be possible for her and would in fact be 
unreasonable. 
 
D. Where We Are Now: The Implications of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- in 
Light of Matter of A-R-C-G- 
The introduction of Matter of A-R-C-G- into the legal landscape is a 
significant step forward in the development of a concrete and dependable legal 
basis for domestic violence-based asylum claims. However, the highly political 
discretion that pervaded the pre-Matter of A-R-C-G- landscape continues today. 
The legal and practical problems that underpinned the use of Matter of R-A- and 
Matter of L-R- as the basis for domestic violence-based asylum claims survive in 
large part, and it is therefore important to examine those problems as they 
existed before the most recent decision, and how Matter of A-R-C-G- may affect 
those issues in the future. 
Even a cursory review of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- reveals a number 
of legal and practical problems for bringing domestic violence-based asylum 
claims. First, neither Matter of R-A- nor Matter of L-R- is binding precedent. 
Although the initial BIA decision and the Attorney General’s decision in Rody 
Alvadrado’s case have been published, the final BIA decision and the 
Immigration Judge’s order granting asylum after ten years of litigation are not 
published and therefore are not binding precedent. Further, none of the opinions 
in Matter of L-R- are published. As a result, the most that an asylum lawyer can 
gain from these two cases, where a woman was granted asylum based on her 
membership in a particular social group and the persecution she suffered in her 
abusive marriage, is an opportunity to push the Department of Homeland 
Security to remain consistent in its requirements for a successful asylum claim. 
Second, the success of these two cases was heavily dependent on many, 
many hours of legal work. The countless hours of research to find the necessary 
 
 136.  Id. at 395. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii) (2014)). 
 139.  Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii) (2014)). 
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legal theory and the appropriate experts would have been almost impossible for 
an individual asylum applicant to do by him or herself. Even if the legal theory 
were fairly self-explanatory, the effort to find the necessary evidence and fulfill 
the complicated requirements of any asylum claim is practically impossible for 
anyone without a legal education (or at least for anyone not in the process of 
getting such an education). The difficulty of presenting a domestic violence-
based asylum case would not be a problem if all applicants had a right to free 
legal representation upon a showing of indigence. However, since Immigration 
Court is an administrative court and since immigration law is not considered 
equivalent to criminal law, individuals in immigration proceedings are allowed, 
but not entitled, to have legal representation, even though they are often strongly 
advised at their initial hearing to procure representation.140 TRAC Immigration, 
an independent organization at Syracuse University that collects data on 
immigration case law, found that although asylum seekers are becoming more 
and more successful, this increase in approval rates is attributable in part to a 
concurrent increase in legal representation—in 2010, 91% of all asylum seekers 
were represented, compared to 52% in 1986.141 Further, during FY 2010, 54% of 
asylum seekers with legal representation were actually granted asylum, 
compared to only 11% of those without legal representation.142 
This significance of legal representation becomes even more significant in 
light of the strained budgets of free immigration legal services organizations. 
According to data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), 
there are about 864 immigration nonprofits scattered across the country.143 A 
quarter of those have an annual budget of less than $250,000, another quarter 
have budgets of less than $999,999, a little over another quarter have budgets of 
less than $5 million, and a quarter have budgets of more than $5 million.144 In 
addition to these limited budgets, “the ratio of nonprofits that provide legal aid 
to immigrants to potential undocumented clients is considerable….”145 As such, 
it is apparent that not all qualified immigrants can even obtain access to free legal 
services, and may therefore be forced to defend their asylum (as well as other 
immigration relief) cases pro se, thus risking a far higher rate of failure. For the 
population of domestic violence victims, the prospect of failure and the danger of 
being sent back to a country where his or her abuser can easily find him or her 
weighs heavily against even trying to apply for asylum, and weighs in favor of 
living instead in the shadows as an undocumented immigrant. 
Further, when one examines the rate of denial of asylum applications, it is 
 
 140.  Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: Immigration, 
Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2013) (arguing that the right to counsel 
found in Gideon v. Wainwright should be extended to individuals in deportation proceedings, given 
the abundance of similarities between immigration law and criminal law). 
 141.  Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010 Results, A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2014). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Erwin de Leon & Robert Roach, Immigrant Legal-Aid Organizations in the United States, URBAN 
INST. (Oct. 2013), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412928-Immigrant-Legal-Aid-
Organizations-in-the-United-States.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
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apparent that there are certain political preconceptions at play in the minds of 
the Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Countries with 
the highest denial rates include El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Ecuador, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines.146 Interestingly, these countries are also high on the list of the 
countries of origin for undocumented immigrants in the United States.147 Among 
the countries with the lowest rate of asylum denial are Iraq, the former Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, Somalia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan.148 As such, if a victim 
of domestic violence (or any other sort of persecution) comes from a country that 
the United States sees as a significant source of undocumented immigrants, he or 
she will also have to fight to show that they will not be part of the flood across 
the border. 
When one looks specifically at the rate at which domestic violence-based 
asylum claims are granted and denied, it becomes apparent that the lack of 
clarity and binding precedent in the case law and regulations, and the resulting 
increased degree of discretion on the part of Immigration Judges, has resulted in 
disparate outcomes across the United States. For example, Blaine Bookey 
conducted an analysis of 206 case outcomes in domestic violence-based asylum 
claims in the United States from 1994 to 2012, and found that “the absence of 
applicable norms and the shifting policy positions on the part of [the Department 
of Homeland Security] have continued to produce contradictory and arbitrary 
outcomes in domestic violence asylum cases.”149 While some IJs choose to follow 
the precedent of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- and grant applicants who have 
suffered serious domestic violence asylum, other IJs refuse to grant asylum 
because they consider domestic violence to be a purely personal dispute, beyond 
the reach of asylum law.150 According to Bookey, “whether a woman fleeing 
domestic violence will receive protection in the United States seems to depend 
not on the consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of 
her individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.”151 
A woman fleeing domestic violence in the era before the most recent BIA 
decision of Matter of A-R-C-G- therefore had her right to be free from persecution 
nullified on several fronts. First, she could not know what the appropriate legal 
framework would be, since the final decisions in both Matter of R-A- and Matter 
of L-R- are unpublished, and provide little information other than to find that, 
based on the stipulated agreement of the Department of Homeland Security with 
 
 146.  Asylum Denial Rates by Nationality Before and After the Attorney General’s Directive (by denial 
rate), TRAC IMMIGRATION (2010), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/nationality_denial.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014) [hereinafter Asylum Denial Rates]. 
 147.  Michael Hofer, et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United 
States: January 2011, POPULATION ESTIMATES (Mar. 2012) (listing, in order of estimated undocumented 
population, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, China, Philippines, India, Korea, Ecuador, 
and Vietnam), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf. 
 148.  Asylum Denial Rates, supra note 146. 
 149.  Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the 
United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 107, 147 (2013). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 147–48. 
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the applicant that she has suffered persecution on account of her membership in 
a particular social group, the applicant’s application for asylum will actually be 
granted. Second, it was (and continues to be) nearly impossible for anyone to win 
any asylum case without legal representation, let alone a complicated asylum 
case based on domestic violence, and the financial resources of legal aid 
organizations were (and continue to be) extremely limited. This disfavors women 
who do not have the ideal case for impact litigation and are unable to finance 
paid legal representation. Finally, even if an individual applicant managed to do 
all necessary legal work and procure representation, the success of her claim still 
depended on the opinion of the individual Immigration Judge. 
In light of Matter of A-R-C-G-, the most significant change is that there is 
now a binding decision establishing that domestic violence can be the basis for an 
asylum claim, where the particular social group is Guatemalan women who are 
unable to leave their marriage. There are, however, three enduring limitations on 
the ability of domestic violence to serve as a basis for asylum. First, the lead 
respondent in Matter of A-R-C-G- did not actually receive asylum based on this 
decision – she still had to show that the Guatemalan government was unable or 
unwilling to control her husband (the private actor), and the Department of 
Homeland Security would most likely argue that it would have been both 
reasonable and practicable for her to move within Guatemala, rather than enter 
the United States without inspection, along with her three minor children. 
Second, the Department of Homeland Security made an essential concession 
in this case, as it did in Matter of L-R-, that the lead respondent both suffered 
persecution and this persecution was on account of her membership in the 
particular social group. With this concession, the BIA can more easily overcome 
the Immigration Judge’s initial finding that the respondent had not 
demonstrated that her husband “abused her in order to overcome the fact that she 
was a married woman in Guatemala who was unable to leave the 
relationship.”152 Essentially, the Board of Immigration Appeals decided issues 
that had already been agreed upon by both sides, and merely made that 
concession binding on itself in the future. 
Third, this binding decision can only go so far, since it is subject to the same 
financial and knowledge constraints in place before the decision was issued. This 
is still only a single decision with fairly atrocious facts, where the lead 
respondent managed to gain both representation and the attention of prominent 
immigration law organizations.153 The BIA decision is limited to an extremely 
fact-specific analysis that still leaves significant discretion to Immigration Judges 
to determine whether the persecution suffered by an applicant was actually on 
account of a particular social group defined by the requisite immutable 
characteristics with sufficient particularity and social distinction. The Federal 
Regulations continue to provide that “the question whether a person is a 
member of a particular social group is a finding of fact that [the BIA] review[s] 
 
 152.  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014) (internal quotations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 153.  Several prominent organizations filed amici curiae in this case, including the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform, the National Immigrant Justice Center, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and Williams & Connolly, LLP.  Id. at 388. 
Doedens_JCI (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2015 3:08 PM 
 The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims 133 
for clear error.”154 
 
III. OTHER GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: WHY ARE THEY DIFFERENT? 
Other gender-based and sex-based asylum claims are more successful than 
domestic violence-based asylum claims for two reasons. First, the particular 
social group itself more easily satisfies the conditions of being defined by 
immutable characteristics, with sufficient particularity and social distinction or 
social visibility. Second, the persecution is more likely to be understood as 
“foreign” to the United States, and therefore more likely to be considered 
political rather than simply personal. 
For example, consider the case of female genital mutilation (FGM). The 
practice is defined by the World Health Organization as “the partial or total 
removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital 
organs for non-medical reasons.”155 Any mention of the practice gets Western 
feminists and human rights activists up in arms, but it is widely believed that 
any form of the practice occurs mostly outside of the United States.156 The 
practice is associated with countries and cultures perceived as underdeveloped, 
making it easier to denounce the practice as an atrocious human rights violation. 
This stands in stark contrast to domestic violence, which occurs frequently in the 
United States—in 2008, an intimate partner was responsible for one in five rapes 
or sexual assaults committed against females.157 
Given this distinction between domestic violence and FGM, it is not 
surprising that the BIA found persecution on account of membership in a 
particular social group in Matter of Kasinga in 1996, and the BIA felt the need in 
Matter of R-A- to distinguish Rody’s situation from that of the applicant in the 
earlier case.158 In Matter of Kasinga, the court recognized first that FGM could 
 
 154.  Id. at 391 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2014)). 
 155.  SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PROTECTING 
GIRLS AND WOMEN IN THE U.S. FROM FGM AND VACATION CUTTING 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org/storage/sanctuary/documents/report_onfgm_w_cover.pdf 
(internal citations omitted).  WHO divides the practice into four categories:  
Type I Clitorodectomy, or the partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or clitoral 
hood. 
Type II The partial or total removal of the clitoris and inner labia, with or without the 
removal of the outer labia. 
Type III Infibulation, or the removal of the external female genitalia and the sealing or 
narrowing of the vaginal opening using stitches or glue. The clitoris may or may 
not be removed. A small hole is left for urination and menstruation and women 
subjected to this procedure are later cut open for intercourse and childbirth. 
Type IV All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, 
such as pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, and cauterization.  
     Id.  
 156.  Jodie Gummow, Evidence Shows That Illegal Female Genital Cutting Is a Growing Phenomenon in 
US, ALTERNET (June 21, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/gender/evidence-shows-illegal-female-
genital-cutting-growing-phenomenon-us (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 157.  10 Facts on Female Victims of Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/220 (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 158.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding that one of the reasons that Rody’s 
social group fails to qualify is that Rody “has not shown that spouse abuse is itself an important 
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constitute persecution for the purposes of the refugee definition.159 The court 
further found that the group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice” 
qualified as a particular social group because it was defined by immutable 
characteristics.160 In particular, the BIA found that the “characteristic of having 
intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young 
woman that she should not be required to change it.”161 Finally, the BIA was able 
to find that the persecution the applicant suffered was on account of her 
membership in the particular social group because the record demonstrated that 
“FGM is practiced, at least in some significant part, to overcome sexual 
characteristics of young women of the tribe who have not been, and do not wish 
to be, subjected to FGM.”162 By making this decision, the BIA was able to fulfill 
its desire to “save the women” from the barbaric practice, while not 
compromising the integrity of its own society’s dark underbelly. 
A similar pattern is evident in the case of asylum claims based on sexual 
orientation. For example, in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals found that homosexuals in Cuba constituted a particular social group 
for the purposes of asylum law, where the Cuban government classified 
homosexuals as a group, criminalized homosexuality, maintained files on alleged 
homosexuals, and required registration and periodic exams.163 The Cuban 
applicant could therefore easily show that he was classified as a homosexual by 
the Cuban government (i.e. considered a member of the alleged particular social 
group by his alleged persecutors), and that he suffered persecution on account of 
that membership. Importantly, the BIA noted the uncontroverted nature of the 
IJ’s finding that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic, despite the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s argument that homosexual activity 
“…is not a basis for finding a social group within the contemplation of the Act” 
as such a conclusion “would be tantamount to awarding discretionary relief to 
those involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in nature, but in 
violation of the laws or regulations of the country as well.”164 The BIA’s refusal to 
entertain the Service’s proposal that homosexuality did not qualify because it 
would be analogous to encouraging general lawlessness indicates the political 
underpinnings of its decision. Even though homosexuality was still frowned 
upon in many parts of the United States when Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was 
decided in 1990, there was still a prevailing attitude that the constant surveillance 
and invasive medical examinations required in Cuba would not be tolerated in 
the United States.165 The applicant was of course also helped by the fact that he 
 
societal attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of being abused is one that is important 
within Guatemalan society,” contrary to Matter of Kasinga, where the fact of not yet being “cut” was 
an important attribute in the relevant society). 
 159.  Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 160.  Id. at 365–66. 
 161.  Id. at 366. 
 162.  Id. at 367. 
 163.  Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820–21 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 164.  Id. at 822 (internal quotations omitted). 
 165.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a Georgia sodomy statute did 
not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals because at least twenty-five state still had such 
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claimed persecution not by a non-state actor but by the Cuban government, an 
entity out of favor with the U.S. federal government since the 1960s. 
As American positions toward homosexuality evolve and the belief that 
individuals should not be persecuted on account of their sexual orientation gains 
more traction in the United States,166 the view of the BIA in Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso will become the “civilized” one, and the United States could develop a 
need to “save the (stereotypically effeminate or biologically female) 
homosexuals” from their “uncivilized” countries and cultures of origin. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By first outlining the basics of asylum law and then proceeding to focus on 
how gender-based asylum claims in general and domestic violence, female 
genital mutilation, and sexual orientation-based asylum claims are legally 
possible and are actually granted, I have shown that the degree of discretion and 
disparity between the legal possibilities and the actual rate at which asylum 
claims are granted is truly astonishing. If, as was the initial impetus for the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, every individual is entitled to be 
free from persecution, then the fact that individual asylum applicants so often 
have difficulty demonstrating that the horrors they have suffered occurred on 
account of an enumerated ground should be cause for concern. 
A skeptic might ask why the United States has to be the one to take in these 
asylum seekers and recognize their persecution. The answer is fairly simple. If 
we are serious about enforcing human rights and protecting every individual’s 
right to be free from persecution, then it does not matter why these asylum 
seekers picked the U.S. Instead of sending asylum seekers back to their lives of 
violence and persecution, the United States needs to do more to treat the 
symptom. We cannot just build a wall of border patrol agents and barbed wire 
while we look south to a country embroiled in a de facto civil war and further 
south to countries struggling under the dominance of gangs. 
In the case of domestic violence-based asylum claims, the effective 
nullification of the right to be free from persecution due to the uncertain legal 
standards, the simultaneous importance and difficulty of procuring legal 
representation, and the unpredictability of an Immigration Judge’s perception of 
an individual applicant’s domestic violence as purely personal or somehow 
political or based on membership in a qualifying particular social group is even 
more troubling. Perhaps there is a need to amend the original definition of what 
constitutes a refugee or asylee to accommodate modern understandings of 
formerly “private” violence. Perhaps the United States needs to develop a new 
visa specifically for undocumented victims of domestic violence, in the same way 
that the Violence Against Women Act allows abused spouses of U.S. citizens and 
legal permanent residents to apply for their own legal permanent residency 
independently of their abusive spouses, or the U-Visa creates a pathway to 
 
laws on the books, and states had the ability to legislate for the purpose of enforcing certain notions 
of morality). 
 166.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (outlining the expansion of the right to 
marry to same-sex couples, as notions of equality have changed). 
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citizenship for victims of domestic violence who report the crime to the police 
and help bring their abusers to justice.167 However, given the current reluctance 
of Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform, and the difficulties 
Congress had in even reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act in the 
summer of 2013,168 it seems unlikely that such legislative remedies will come to 
pass. As such, immigration attorneys and advocates, as well as their clients and 
those who are unable to obtain representation but may have an actionable claim 
for asylum based on domestic violence, are left in limbo. The most one can do is 
put the system to the test, force it to enunciate its rationale for denying (or 
granting) asylum to a particular individual, while doing one’s best to comply 
with the complicated legal standards promulgated under Matter of R-A- and 
Matter of L-R- and developing the binding precedent of Matter of A-R-C-G-. In 
short, the players must play the politics, let adjudicators hear the stories in the 
terms they want to hear, and hope that their story fits the requirements for relief. 
 
 
 167.  Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-
Petitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (APR. 11, 2008), 
http://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-news/fact-sheet-uscis-issues-guidance-approved-violence-
against-women-act-vawa-self-petitioners (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); Victims of Criminal Activity, U 
Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-
criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 168.  Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong with the Violence Against Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-against-women-act/ (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2014) (reporting on the political fight surrounding the reauthorization of VAWA). 
